Details | Case |
Strict Liability | |
Mens rea is subjective. Not liable for honest misinformation. | |
The application of force during a consensual sporting game is not unlawful. | |
No factual causation as the men would have died whether the hospital had been negligent or not. The operating cause of their death was the poison, not their hospital treatment. | |
Specific intent is required to convict s.18 OAPA 1861. | |
Strict Liability | |
Egg-shell skull rule. You must take the victim as you find them. | |
The omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a p | |
When there is more than one accepted method of doing something, either can fulfill a duty of care. | |
The court has the perogative to over-rule the generally accepted conduct of a profession. | |
A lower standard of care is owed when the risk of something happening is very low. See Haley. | |
No physical proximity as C was in a safe place when the negligence occurred and elected to move after the accident. | |
Damage from the cold was forseeable and so it is irrelevant that this damage took a particularly unusual form, D was still liable. See Hughes. | |
A series of minor injuries can amount to a grevious injury. | |
Held as assault even though it was not in person. See Smith v Woking, Ireland, Constanza, Mead. | |
Three-part test for duty of care. | |
'Physical or psychological injury.' | |
D is still the operating and substantial cause of V's death. Therefore no NAI. | |
Continuing mens rea and coincidence of actus reus. | |
Held as assault even though it was not in person. See Smith v Woking, Ireland, Burstow, Mead. | |
While the particular outcome was not forseeable, that type of harm was. Therefore no NAI. | |
Recklessness. | |
A lower standard of care is owed when there are clear social benefits of taking a risk. | |
GBH can take the form of diseases. (Biological GBH). | |
The neighbour principle. | |
It was not known that such a reaction could occur, and so the damage was too remote and D was not liable. | |
Indirect force. | |
Liable for omissions when in a position of public responsibility. | |
| Details | Case |
Continuing actus reus and coincidence of mens rea. | |
There are multiple factual causes in special circumstances on policy grounds. | |
Reasonable forseeability test. Learn these four steps. | |
Strict Liability | |
Parents have a duty to look after their children. (See Shepherd) | |
The size of the risk was quite high in this case as about 1 in 500 people are partially sighted or blind. Therefore, a higher standard of care was owed. See Bolton. | |
Indirect force. Held as a battery to the baby. | |
Not liable for involuntary acts. | |
Damage in general was forseeable so it is irrelevant that the damage took a particularly unusuall form, D was still liable. See Bradford. | |
Held as assault even though it was not in person. See Smith v Woking, Burstow, Constanza, Mead. | |
Definition of a wound. Internal bleeding is not a breaking in the continuation of both layers of the skin and so not a wound. | |
Medical treatment is palpably wrong and so constitutes a novus actus interveniens. | |
It is reasonably forseeable that someone in C's position would have been harmed by D's negligence. | |
Transferred malice from C to V. | |
A lower standard of care is owed when D has taken all reasonable precautions. | |
Continuation of mens rea. | |
Held as assault even though there was no actual threat. | |
Strict Liability | |
A higher culpability (blameworthiness) is required to be liable for omissions, than acts. | |
D is still the operating and substantial cause of V's death. Therefore no NAI. | |
Oblique intent. | |
There is proximity as C's family have a relationship with C. | |
Held as assault. See Smith v Woking, Ireland, Burstow, Constanza. | |
Liable for failing to minimise the negative consequences of your own harmful acts. | |
Transferred malice from C to V. | |
'Making the decision to bring about, so long as it lies within D's powers, the consequence of a criminal action. | |
It was fair just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on the police service. See Orange. | |
Learners are expected to be of the competency of a fully trained person in that skill. | |
| Details | Case |
It was not fair just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on the police service. See MPC v Reeves. | |
Factual causation. But for D's actions, V would not have died. | |
C had a special characteristic meaning the standard of care owed to him was higher. | |
Malice can only be transferred for the same offence. It cannot be transferred between two different offences such as ABH and destruction of property. | |
Liable for omissions when contractually obligated to act. | |
D liable as V's actions were a reasonable response to D's actions. Therefore no NAI. See Williams. | |
The reasonable man cannot be responsible for things that no one knew could happen. | |
'Intention or recklessness to inflict a battery, and/or some bodily harm' 'Maliciously' implies intention or recklessness.' | |
Parents only have a duty to look after their children up to the age of 18. | |
Strict Liability | |
D is still the operating and substantial cause of V's death. Therefore no NAI. | |
Harm is not only limited to skin, flesh and bones, and can include hair. | |
Held as assault even though no words were spoken. See Ireland, Burstow, Constanza, Mead. | |
Take the victim as you find him. D was still liable even though C had an unusually high sensitivity. | |
It was not reasonably forseeable for D for vandals to set fire to the property. It was a new and intervening act. | |
Subjectively unforseeable events cannot constitute Cunningham recklessness. | |
Liable for omissions when you have voluntarily assumed responsibility to act. | |
Continuing mens rea and coincidence of actus reus. | |
Held as battery, even though there was no actual touching. | |
'Intention or recklessness to apply unlawful force to another.' | |
Damage from the oil was forseeable, but damage from the fire was too remote, meaning D was not liable for this damage. | |
C had a special characteristic meaning the standard of care owed to him was higher. | |
A lower standard of care is owed when there are clear social benefits of taking a risk. | |
The industry standard is always expected from D. Here, he was expected to be of the competency of the reasonable professional carpenter. | |
No factual causation. But for D's actions, V would still have died. | |
D not liable as V's actions were not a reasonable response to D's actions. Therefore NAI. See Roberts. | |
Oblique intent. | |
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