A prohibition against expression of opinion, without any evidence that the rule is necessary to avoid substantial interference with school discipline or the rights of others, is not permissible under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Freedom of speech and of the press are among the personal rights and liberties protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.
The taxation statute and resolution did not violate the provision of the First Amendment (made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment) prohibiting any 'law respecting an establishment of religion.'
The State's interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children.
Liberty of the press is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action.
Under the Free Exercise Clause, a law that burdens religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest if it is neutral and of general applicability. However, where such a law is not neutral or not of general application, it must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny: It must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.
Because of the prohibition of the First Amendment against the enactment of any law 'respecting an establishment of religion,' which is made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, state officials may not compose an official state prayer and require that it be recited in the public schools of the State at the beginning of each school day -- even if the prayer is denominationally neutral and pupils who wish to do so may remain silent or be excused from the room while the prayer is being recited.
Under the circumstances, [defendant's] burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct, permitting [defendent] to invoke the First Amendment.
Words which, ordinarily and in many places, would be within the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment may become subject to prohibition when of such a nature and used in such circumstances a to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils which Congress has a right to prevent.
For a law to be considered constitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the law must have a legitimate secular purpose, must not have the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion, and also must not result in an excessive entanglement of government and religion.
A few limited categories of speech, such as obscenity, defamation, and fighting words, may be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content. However, these categories are not entirely invisible to the Constitution, and government may not regulate them based on hostility, or favoritism, towards a nonpros crib able message they contain.
Freedoms of speech and press do not permit a State to forbid advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
The enactment by a State of any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.
For purposes of determining whether to grant a place on the ballot, a group advocating violent overthrow as abstract doctrine need not be regarded as necessarily advocating unlawful action.
Under the First Amendment, the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers a political point, but it does not follow that the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public school. It is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.
This utilization of the State's tax supported public school system and its machinery for compulsory public school attendance to enable sectarian groups to give religious instruction to public school pupils in public school buildings violates the First Amendment of the Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Depictions of animal cruelty are not, as a class, categorically unprotected by the First Amendment.
The Internet is entitled to the full protection given to media like the print press; the special factors justifying government regulation of broadcast media do not apply.
To exercise prior restraint, the Government must show sufficient evidence that the publication would cause a “grave and irreparable” danger.
Because the must-carry provisions impose special obligations upon cable operators and special burdens upon cable programmers, heightened First Amendment scrutiny is demanded.
Government actions that unconstitutionally burden the First Amendment right of expressive association may take many forms, one of which is intrusion into a group's internal affairs by forcing it to accept a member it does not desire. Such forced membership is unconstitutional if the person's presence affects in a significant way the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.
The First Amendment prohibits the government from restricting political independent expenditures by corporations, associations, or labor unions.
Speech on a public sidewalk, about a public issue, cannot be liable for a tort of emotional distress, even if the speech is found to be 'outrageous.'
A party's religious belief cannot be accepted as a justification for his committing an overt act, made criminal by the law of the land.
Teaching creationism in public schools is unconstitutional because it attempts to advance a particular religion.