Chamberlain received a 'unaminous standing overvation'

'clever and sensible strategy'

'forced on Chamberlain'

'underinvestment of defence'

'was it not Chamberlain and Halifax by buying time really enabled Britain to survive in 1940?'

War would be won by the country who produced the 'most military equipment'

If GB didn't appease there would be no chance of survival as we had to prepare for war on 4 fronts.

'policy of keeping Germany guessing''

'good idea but was not intentional'

'not a triumph for Hitler'

Rapproachement reflected GB's efforts to sustain 'political dignity'

'Perhaps Chamberlain was the right Prime Minister in 1937, as Churchill certainly was in 1940'

Only Chamblerlain had been able to 'soothe' Mussolini

Referred to people who supported the policy as 'appeasers'

Used to mean 'bringing peace and now is loaded with shame and embarrassment'

Halifax and Chamberlain are remembered as 'guilty men'

'the government rejected effective deterrence'

'most profound disgust' (Atlee)

'one of the biggest diasters in British history' (Atlee)

Promised not to go to war with each other, therefore no preservation of peace

GB public were 'enthusiastic about peace so he upped his demands'

'Hitler was not playing the game in the first place'

'no longer be coerced except by the actual use of force'

'Hitler could never be trusted, because he actually wanted war'

Halifax believed Hitler had 'no policy of immediate adventure'

'A high level of military preparedness would have been unnecessary expenditure of industrial and human effort'

Rearming had to involve 'intelligent guesswork'

Had to prepare for 'every contingency'

He [Chamberlain] would not drive for collective security which could have held Hitler, and would not make genuine peace'

Assured Britain that his concessions had brought 'peace in our time'

'You may gain temporary appeasement by a policy of concession to violence, but you do not gain lasting peace that way'

'We should seek by all means in our power to avoid war'

Churchill saw appeasement as an opportunity to change the Tory party, whilst Chamberlain was clinging onto the leadership

GB government were 'not doing their duty'

'peace with honour'

Munich Agreement was a 'total and unmitigated diaster'

The French 'never can keep a secret for more than half an hour - nor a government for more than 9 months'

He thought the best policy was 'to hope for the best but be prepared for the worst'

Guarantee to Poland was a 'hasty and ill-prepared deterrent'

If Hitler gave up the 'abuse of force' his demands would have been considered

Polish guarantee was a 'deterrent' which had a 'political, moral and psychological value'

Chamberlain 'was not the dupe of Hitler'

Chamberlain was 'a shrewd politician'

Refers to the appeasers as 'actors'

Daladier felt 'shame' about losing Czechoslovakia

Musso felt his role as a 'mediator was a sham' at Munich

Hitler 'resented his own failure' at Munich

Chamberlain applied 'fuss and interference' in order to sustain peace

General Ironside says to go to war with Germany in 1938 would have been to 'commit suicide'

General Ironside: GB didn't have 'the means to defend ourselves'

'war wins nothing, cures nothing, ends nothing'

'sacrificing weaker nations for the profit of Britain'

'How can we ever look a foreigner in the face again'

'the power of an airforce is a terrific thing when there is nothing to oppose it'